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ON SCREENING AND THE 
INSIDER THREAT – A 
METHODOLOGICAL EXPLORATION 




An under researched issue in security is screening 
combined with the insider threat. One of the 
problems is the lack of data. Human Resource 
Management (HRM) departments don’t like to 
disclose cases and modus operandi. Also the filing 
is incomplete. It leads to a situation in which theory 
building is hardly possible. Therefore, this 
explorative essay is written from a more 
methodological perspective.  
From the scarce information that was obtained 
from expert practitioners, there seems not to be 
such a thing as a standard profile of an insider 
threat. At the same time, an estimated 75% of the 
offenders has shown to have been actually bona 
fide at the original pre-employment screening. It 
calls for a reflection on current screening 
practices. 
 
1 In 2005, Giliam de Valk published his PhD on the quality 
intelligence analyses have to meet. He is specialized in the 
methodology of security and intelligence analysis. He has worked at 
the University of Amsterdam, the University of Utrecht, and the 
Netherlands Defense Academy where he coordinated and lectured 
a minor on intelligence studies. At the moment he is an assistant 













































Such an approach has its limitations. Scenarios 
for offenders cannot be built, because the causes 
are too diverse and the cases too unique. As files 
are hardly kept – and HRM departments are not 
so willing to share – a big data approach is also 
not a likely option. 
A way out could be to test the loyalty of 
employees. In such a system, the emphasis will 
be on a so-called during-employment screening. 
The interviewer, together with the applicant, will 
assess the applicant’s vulnerabilities. After this 
assessment, the applicant will be tested on his/her 
vulnerabilities during his/her entire career, 
Also, there needs to be a shift in the culture at 
HRM departments. They have to change from 
steering on mistakes, into being a safety net for 
employees that have (personal) problems. It also 
implies a change in interaction – from discussion 
to dialogue. 
Finally, in a working environment that is evolving 
towards a more networked way of working – 
compared to the classic hierarchical office work – 
the rethinking concerning the screening practices 
will only be the more pressing. 
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At the Ad de Jonge Centre of the University of Amsterdam,2 
an experiment took place that triggered a reflection on the 
current screening approach. At this experiment, it was looked 
for so-called weak signals – small  patterns that are difficult to 
detect in the midst of an overwhelming noise of data, events 
and developments (Hard Rudman Commission, 2008). It 
resulted, among others, in a weak signal that could be a game 
 
2 In 2017, the Ad de Jonge Centre moved to Leiden University and 
integrated in the Institute for Security and Global Affairs. It 









































 changer on the middle and long term. It was on a possible 
trend in mindset within the Western world. 
This weak signal was found in psychological surveys. 
Nowadays, students in the Western world are said to be 40% 
less empathic, and to suffer from an increase in Narcissism 
(Twenge, 2008a. Twenge 2008b). They tend to be more 
egoist, competitive, self-assured, individualistic. And it was 
claimed that there is a correlation with utilitarian responses to 
moral dilemmas (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011. Dutton, 2012). Such 
research findings are debated, but it served as a trigger to 
question if the current screening approach would be adequate 
for that possible change in mindset. 
Another element also triggered the reflection on the current 
screening practices at the critical infrastructure. This is the 
change from the traditional professional bureaucracy – with 
its classic hierarchical office-bound way of working – to a 
more networked based organization in which people also 
work from home. The new environment asks for more agility 
within organizations. Organizations are likely to move from a 
top down controlled and economic goal driven structure into 
a more viable system of self-organized and -managed 
structures. There will then be more emphasis on being unique 
resources centered and human value driven – organized 
around social values and goals, social legitimacy and 
commonality. It may lead to a shift in the way Human 
Resource Management (HRM) will function – from the 
concept of ‘best principles’ as a strategy, into one of 
recommended practices (Houtzager, 2018. Boselie, 2010).  
A problem with studying screening policies and the insider 
threat in the context of critical infrastructure is that data is 
rarely disclosed publicly. It was not, for example, a focal point 
in the reports by the National Advisory Centre Critical 
Infrastructure (NAVI).3 Also more generally, HRM 
departments are not very keen to display their data on insider 
threat offenders, or their modus operandi. Theory building is 
almost completely lacking. Therefore, this article is an 
 
3 The NAVI - Nationaal Adviescentrum Vitale Infrastructuur - ceased 
to function in 2010, after it has made its assessments on the different 
vital infrastructures in the Netherlands. Advisors of the NAVI 














































exploratory essay in this field. It reflects on the current 
screening practices without having an elaborate set of data or 
theory building. The findings will therefore be only preliminary 
findings. As an academic exercise, this is risky. The author 
realizes this. Yet, the interests at stake in the critical 
infrastructure are too high to leave this field undebated.  
2. Types of screening, and risks and threats 
There are different forms of screening. In this section, they will 
be defined in the sense they are discussed in this article (2.1). 
Furthermore, I will reflect on how different ways of screening 
are rooted in different methodological backgrounds (2.2).  
2.1 Types of screening 
Screening: to investigate systematically if the information 
given by the candidate/employee is in accordance with reality, 
and if no relevant information is being withheld (VBN, 2018).  
Pre-employment screening: to carry out a positive vetting of a 
potential candidate (VBN, 2018). Data and information are 
collected to assess the risks in order to see if a tenure is 
justified. 
In-employment screening: periodically carrying out a 
screening for those employees who get a new function or 
responsibility within the organization where they are working 
(VBN, 2018). This often happens if they get more 
competences or responsibilities. In the Dutch practice, this is 
often a shortened version of the pre-employment screening.  
Post-employment screening: A screening and exit briefing 
when an employee leaves the organization (VBN, 2018). 
During-employment screening: a combination of a pre-
employment screening – in which the vulnerabilities of a 
candidate are assessed – and of tests on his/her 
vulnerabilities during the entire employment, to refute that this 
person poses a threat. 
2.2. Screening: risk mitigation or threat approach? 
A risk is the chance that an incident might take place, 
multiplied by the impact: the quantitative multiplication of the 
probability of the occurrence of an event by its estimated 









































 incidents and the impact itself (compare: Glendon, 2016) The 
focus is on assessing the risk.  
A threat is here shortly defined as an undesirable event that 
you do not want to take place. A threat does not necessarily 
cause actual harm. It is on the nature of occurrence (National 
Information Assurance Training and Education Center, 
consulted in 2013). In a threat approach, you do not want that 
the event takes place in the first place.  
Most of the types of screening are based upon risk mitigation. 
In the Dutch context, both the pre-employment and the in-
employment screening are meant to assess the risks of the 
candidate/employee in order to see if a tenure/promotion is 
justified. In the during-employment screening, on the contrary, 
the tests on the person’s vulnerabilities are meant to refute 
that an employee poses a threat.  
This difference in risk and threat approach is fundamental, 
and refers to the α and the β. The α is the chance that you 
incorrectly conclude that there is a significant relationship 
between phenomena. The β is the chance that you do not 
discover a weak, but actually existing, relationship between 
phenomena (De Valk, 2005, 66-67). In the pre-employment 
screening, the emphasis will be on reducing the value of the 
α – the chance that HRM incorrectly assesses the risks of the 
candidate. In the during-employment screening, the emphasis 
will be not missing a threat – to reduce the value of the β. We 
will return on the α and β, in the evaluation of preferred ways 
of screening. 
3. The Dutch context  
In the Netherlands, there is not much available data on 
screening. If there is data, it is, for example, on people who 
did not pass the pre-employment screening and subsequently 
were rejected for the job (Levent Bedrijfsrecherche, 2018 in: 
VBN, 2018). But this is not the same as the correctness of 
those rejections. It also gives no insight in the number of 
people who actually passed the pre-employment screening 
and then, after the screening, turned into an insider threat. In 
methodological terms, the data on people who passed the 
screening does not tell anything about the Type I and Type II 
errors of this pre-employment screening process. What is the 
number of the people that were incorrectly rejected from 
getting the job (Type I error)? And what is the number of the 











































that was missed (Type II error)? In short, this data gives no 
insight in the validity and accuracy of the pre-employment 
screening process.  
Information on screening and the insider threat is scarce. It is 
even more scarce in surveys. One of the few exceptions is a 
publication by Sollie and De Weger in which it is hinted at the 
need of more in-employment screening, especially in relation 
to military missions (Sollie & De Weger, 2011). Yet, the focus 
in this research is on crossing to the dark side, and not on the 
type of screening. The main problem for this lack of data is 
obvious – HRM officials are not too happy to disclose their 
failures.  
Still, some data is present. However, it concerns unpublished 
research findings – with a request of no referencing. The 
following results were found. The first set of findings was that 
four elements appeared more than average in offender cases:  
1. Employees with open-ended contracts were more often 
offenders than their colleagues with fixed contracts. 
2. Employees working more than 10 years at the same 
organization were overrepresented as offenders. 
3. More than average, a life changing event had taken 
place. 
4. Employees with a Narcistic personality were 
overrepresented. 
Still, these four elements did not result in a typical profile, even 
not in combination. For that, the correlation was simply too 
low, and the number of variables too big. The causes were 
too diverse and the cases too unique.  
A second set of findings concerned the relationship between 
the original pre-employment screening and the actual 
derailing of the employee. After a reconstructions of the 
cases, the remarkable number of an estimated 75% of the 
employees showed to have been actually bona fide at the 
original pre-employment screening. This last finding puts a 
serious question mark at the current practice of pre-
employment screening. If this data is correct, it implies that 
the current system of pre-employment screening will miss 
75% of the cases of people that later will derail. Is there a 










































 4. Analytical methods and techniques 
If we indeed miss so many cases, we need to reflect on the 
current method of screening. Furthermore, changes may be 
needed in how HRM departments function. In this section, we 
deal with the method and will look, from a methodological 
perspective, at alternative options. In the next session, I will 
discuss the HRM. 
Firstly, we need a warning system for the insider threat, For 
that, we can look at an established warning system for 
inspiration. In the military, there is the NIWS – the NATO 
Intelligence Warning System (NATO, 2001. See also: Grabo, 
2002). It is based upon warning scenarios. For each warning 
scenario,  a limited number of so-called critical indicators are 
developed. ‘Critical’ refers to a given scenario that will take 
place if its indicators move into red – the warning mode. To 
use this for the insider threat, however, will cause problems 
concerning the formulation of the warning scenarios. In case 
of the insider threat, the causes are too divers and the cases 
too unique. NIWS often works with three scenarios. Working 
out an endless number of scenarios is not only not workable, 
you still may miss relevant scenarios due to the uniqueness 
of the cases.  
There is also a policy oriented version of scenario building. 
Often drivers on actors and factors are analyzed, and from 
there on, scenarios are constructed.4 But also here occurs 
exactly the same problem – an endless number of scenarios 
for unique cases, that still will not cover the whole picture. 
A third option could be big data analysis. The main problem 
is the data. As put, HRM departments are not very keen to 
display their failures or data. As we will discuss in the next 
session, there is even a problem at the input side of data – 
the practice of not reporting. The lack of data, combined with 
the diversity of causes and unique cases makes a big data 
analysis also an unlikely option. 
If we would choose one of the above options and construct 
some scenarios or flawed big data analysis, it would lead to 
too many Type I and Type II errors. Type I errors could be 
triggered by simplistic scenarios – caused by the absence of 
 
4 This way drivers are assessed at the course Qualitative Analysis 
Techniques. This course is part of the Minor Intelligence Studies at 











































data and the diversity of causes – and would stigmatize whole 
groups of employees, as those being more on the Narcistic 
side of the spectrum. Anyone in the intelligence community 
who is familiar with misdirected mole hunts, knows how 
damaging these are. A high number of Type I errors would 
trigger a tsunami of misdirected mole hunts. So, the methods 
mentioned are not an option to cope with the insider threat.  
What remains as an option is what is called in methodology 
the experiment. In this experiment, the loyalty of the employee 
is tested. Such tests need to be prepared well. It requires an 
extended interview with the candidate/employee, but of a 
different nature than in the current pre-employment 
screening. The experiment is organized around the principle 
that the employee does not pose a threat. It is a threat 
approach, contrary to the pre-employment screening which is 
primarily a risk approach. The experiment is aimed at to lower 
the value of the β. Such an experiment to lower the value of 
the β is also called a red team test (De Valk, 2018). We will 
return to the option of the experiment, after dealing with the 
HRM. 
5. HRM 
As put, HRM is not very keen to share their failures, or data 
on offenders. As a result, other HRM departments cannot 
learn from incidents. Also within the own organization, its 
employees don’t know where to look for. 
This last point is combined with an even more worrying 
observation – and that is the common culture at HRM 
departments. Often, the HRM acts on mistakes of employees, 
but it is not a safety net for employees that have (personal) 
problems. The effect is that the person in question, in case 
he/she is vulnerable (e.g. after a life changing event), will not 
contact HRM for help. Also his/her colleagues will hardly have 
incentives to report on suspect indicators and behavior. The 
same applies to the superiors of the employee in question. 
Superiors hardly tend to keep files. Both in the case of the 
colleagues and the superior, it explains the low willingness to 
report to the HRM. It results in a too little & too late situation, 
at least for the Dutch situation. At the same time, it is for 
insiders often not a surprise that things went wrong – the 
indicators were there. This implies the need for a different 









































 According to Houtzager, an important aspect of prevention is 
to move from discussion to dialogue. The focus is then solely 
asking questions to the other person. This way you support 
the other person in explaining his/her point of view and it helps 
to understand the person better. For that, the person who 
asks the question, also needs to ask him/herself questions – 
to start a dialogue with yourself. There is a mutual interest in 
each other by asking questions. That opens the way to a real 
dialogue (Houtzager, 2018). This is an attitude that differs 
very much from the common practice of HRM departments to 
steer on mistakes. 
To what recommended practice of screening may that lead 
the methodological insights and insights on the culture at the 
HRM?  
6. How to organize the screening against the insider 
threat? 
This section starts with two ideal types of screening. The first 
ideal type is on risk mitigation (pre-employment screening), 
and the second one is on threat assessment (during-
employment screening). The two forms as presented here are 
not the actual ones used in practice, which are to a certain 
extent mixtures of both. But by presenting them as ideal types, 
the working between both types can be explained more 
clearly. Both ideal types of screening were for many years part 
of an assignment for students of the Minor Intelligence 
Studies – first at the Ad de Jonge Centre (University of 
Amsterdam), and later at ISGA (University of Leiden) – to train 
them in Type I (α) and Type II (β) errors. 
6.1 Two ideal types of screening 
An ideal type does not refer to an ideal or desired situation. It 
refers to a ‘pure’ version, in order to explain and show its 
working.  
The first ideal type is on the pre-employment screening. In this 
ideal type, it is assessed that the candidate does not pose a 
risk, and does not live in a vulnerable environment. To carry 
out this screening an elaborate background check is made. 
The interview with the candidate is organized as follows: 
• an extended interview of 4-6 hours is held. This is 
carried out by two persons, of whom one is the 











































• the aim of the interview is to assess whether the 
candidate is vulnerable (e.g. alcohol, drugs, sex, 
money, past, etc.), or has an extremist/violent 
past. The emphasis is on the candidate’s life from 
16 years old onwards. 
• the aim is also to assess whether there are any 
vulnerabilities in the environment of the person, 
like extremists, criminals, or visiting pariah states. 
 
The second ideal type is the during-employment screening. 
During his/her entire career, the employee can be tested on 
his/her vulnerabilities. To do so, an elaborate background 
check was made, as in the case of the previous pre-
employment screening. The major difference is in the 
interview and the follow-up process. This is a three phased 
strategy in order to falsify that the person poses a threat: 
• phase 1 is composed of a long interview, even up 
to more than 10 hours. The interview is held by 
one person in order to build up rapport. The 
interviewer asks the candidate to describe 
him/herself now, and from there they go back in 
time. Finally until the candidate was 3-7 years old. 
This will also give insight in some more primary 
and fundamental patterns that are less 
investigated in the first ideal type. 
• in phase 2 the vulnerabilities of the candidate are 
assessed. Together – interviewer and candidate 
– they make a plan of how to cope with these 
vulnerabilities.  
• phase 3 encompasses the entire career of the 
employee. He/she can be tested – red teamed – 
during his/her entire career on his/her 
vulnerabilities, in order to falsify that he/she poses 
a threat. 
6.2 Methodological advantages 
The two ideal types are based upon two different 
methodological approaches. The pre-employment screening, 
as it is described here, is a risk assessment. It is primarily 
related to reducing the value of the α. It is about assessing 
that the candidate does not pose a risk. The risk assessment 









































 The second ideal type of during-employment screening is 
about falsifying – to refute – that the candidate poses a threat. 
It is a threat assessment that is aimed at not missing a threat. 
It is primarily related to reducing the value of the β.  
If we look at both methodological principles, which is the more 
reliable one: to assess/proof someone’s integrity and loyalty, 
or to falsify that someone poses a threat? From a 
methodological perspective, to try to falsify – to refute – is the 
more reliable approach and therefore the standard in, for 
example, scientific hypothesis testing (De Groot, 1981). From 
a pure methodological perspective, it means that the second 
ideal type – that of during-employment screening – is the 
preferable one.  
But also if we look at the actual data on pre-employment 
screening, the remarkable number of an estimated 75% of the 
insider threats showed to have been actually bona fide at the 
original pre-employment screening. It implies a huge number 
of Type II errors, in which the current system of pre-
employment screening misses 75% of the cases of people 
that later will derail. The practice of pre-employment 
screening has a very serious problem with the value of the β. 
At the same time, no (published) data could be found on the 
value of the α – of candidates that were unjustly or 
unnecessarily were rejected. We will come back on that in the 
next session 6.3. 
6.3 Other advantages  
Besides that during-employment screening has the stronger 
methodological approach than pre-employment screening, it 
has some other additional advantages. Firstly, as it is the 
stronger form, there is a lesser change on unjustly rejecting a 
candidate – that is still a dark number in the current practice 
of screening. In case of doubt – e.g. of a ‘vulnerable 
subcultural’ environment (as the sailor experienced in the 
more wild side of life) – the candidate does not need to be 
rejected, but can be tested on that vulnerability.  
Secondly, you can avoid a monoculture within your 
organization. As it is assumed that everyone has 
vulnerabilities – and this will be tested during their career – 
you can diversify more among the population, subcultures, 
and minorities. Now, there is – at least at the Dutch services 
– an overrepresentation of employees with an autochthonous 











































education and grew up in a rather protected environment (the 
pre-employment screening, by definition, favors candidates 
from a protected environment – as this is an explicit part of 
the assessment). A former employee of the AIVD 
characterized it as an overrepresentation of liberal women 
who – before work – bring their offspring to school in their 
carrier tricycle for children (Versteegh/NRC 2018). Although 
this quote was criticized for its implicit sexism, it points at 
major problem – the danger of a monoculture that will lead to 
a blind spot. To deal with the blind spot, you need different 
perspectives within your organization (compare Zizek, 2006).  
Thirdly, if a case is brought to court, the during-employment 
approach is the better option for the employer. The employer 
does not have to hand over elaborate files with evidence to 
proof the case – and by that have a lot of exposure. The 
employer simply can state that the employee did not pass the 
red team test.  
Fourthly, by going back in time further – 3-7 years old – it can 
be better assessed how someone will function under pressure 
and what the primary patterns are. 
Fifthly, going back in time – from the present to the past – will 
give less room for deception. This is a classic interrogation 
technique.  
Sixthly, an interview by one well-trained and experienced 
person gives more opportunity to build up rapport and avoids 
resembling an interrogation-style interview. Building rapport is 
also known as an effective interrogation technique to get more 
information out of a suspect (Dimitriu, 2009). 
The ideal type of during-employment screening is not only the 
stronger methodological approach, it also has some extra 
advantages that the ideal type of pre-employment screening 
does not have. 
6.4 HRM 
The measures should not be limited to the way the screening 
is carried out. The culture at the HRM should change in the 
first place. HRM should abandon its common approach of 
steering on mistakes. HRM should change it into being a 
safety net for people that have (personal) problems. Only 
then, these employees will ask for help, their colleagues will 









































 keep files. The whole attitude within the organization should 
change from discussion to dialogue.  
7. Conclusion 
This essay started with two observations on changes in 
society – the possible changes in mindset and the differences 
at the working environment. They formed the triggers to 
reflect on the current Dutch screening practices. The findings 
of this essay are based on methodological insights, literature 
on HRM, and scarce and unconfirmed data. Therefore, only  
preliminary conclusions can be drawn. All the evidence, 
however, pointed into one direction concerning two issues. 
These two preliminary conclusions will be presented here. 
Firstly, the culture at companies, and especially at the HRM, 
needs to change. From steering on mistakes, into being a 
safety net for people that have (personal) problems. It also 
implies a change from discussion to dialogue. This will 
increase the grip on the insider threat issue. 
Secondly, the current pre-employment screening practice 
needs to be revised. In open sources, we can find data on 
how many people were rejected for a job. But it doesn’t tell 
anything about the Type I and Type II failures of that type of 
screening. Unpublished research findings suggest that 75% 
of the employees were shown to have been actually bona fide 
at the original pre-employment screening. With such a high 
number of later derailment, you may wonder if the pre-
employment screening is the right approach at all. The value 
of the β is too high.  
There are alternatives. In during-employment screening an 
employee will be tested on his/her vulnerabilities during the 
entire employment. This approach is not on assessing a risk 
– as in pre-employment screening – but on falsifying a threat. 
From a methodological perspective, refutation is the more 
reliable approach. Also, if screening results are put to the test 
in a trial, the employer simply can state that the employee did 
not pass the red team test, instead of handing over elaborate 
proof that the employer would rather have had kept 
undisclosed.   
It is not advocated to apply the during-employment screening 
for all cases. A distinction could be made between functions 
that only will result in risks with a limited potential damage, 











































might be at stake. If there is only a limited risk, you just want 
to minimize the number of incidents and the level of damage 
of those incidents. A risk approach – as in pre-employment 
screening – could then be accurate. But all cases that would 
lead to a threat of the organization or national security – the 
real sensitive functions – a threat approach seems more 
suited. In that case, during-employment screening with its 
approach of falsifying that the employee poses a threat seems 
to be the appropriate one. Such sensitive functions and 
positions within the critical infrastructure need an improved 
protection. In short, a threat approach is needed if the national 
interest is directly at stake. 
During-employment screening is not completely unknown in 
the Dutch context. But as a central focus in a HRM policy, it 
is new. It requires that guidelines are updated, as the one by 
the VBN. In that guideline, meant to last until 2023, the 
emphasis is on risk management. The threat approach and 
the culture at HRM’s are almost completely absent. An update 
is needed, and one may wonder if the Dutch society has the 
luxury to wait until 2023 before doing so.  
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